Rebuilt on the company MIS and the assets-and-liabilities schedule Clinikk shared this week. Every number reconciles to one of those two tabs or to a listing we read ourselves, and is labelled with its source.
A Bengaluru payvider, sub-scale but real12 GP Health Hubs, a 10,000-life insurance book on a corporate agent licence, its own clinic software and ~90,000 patient records. ₹9.24 Cr FY27E revenue, ₹1.58 Cr FY27E burn.
₹2.13 Cr of net liabilities, and a deferred wage billAssets ₹1.18 Cr against ₹3.31 Cr of payable liabilities. ₹1.92 Cr of deferred expenses — future founder salaries — sit outside burn and land mostly in the eight months we would fund.
Yes, priced on what existsValue clinics, FOCO, software at build cost and the licence. Insurance EBITDA projection at zero. Settle first whether we want Practo-branded clinics competing with the hospitals and doctors who pay to be on our marketplace.
| Asset | What exists today | FY27E revenue, ₹ Cr | Economics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retail clinicsCOCO + FOCO | 12 Health Hubs in Bengaluru. 150,620 walk-ins since Jan 2023, 57% non-member. 4.87 Google rating on 6,861 reviews. | 2.36 +21.6% | COCO: 80% gross margin, but hub fixed cost is 134% of revenue; ₹1.5 to 1.7 Cr lost a year, three years running. FOCO: ₹0.23 to 0.67 Cr, EBITDA positive, franchisee funds capex and ramp losses. |
| InsurancePlans + commission | 10,000 lives. Composite corporate agent approval. 826 hospitalisation claim episodes, ₹4.47 Cr insurer-paid value, 68.7% in Bengaluru. | 6.88 −44.9% | 42% gross margin. The entire decline is one cancelled B2B2C contract: ₹7.25 Cr in FY26 to a ₹1.48 Cr tail. Retail and MSME ₹4.71 Cr, −6.5%. Commission ₹0.69 Cr, +263% at close to 100% margin. |
| SoftwareClinikk OS | Three proprietary apps (doctor, patient, operations), openEHR with FHIR, ABDM-ready, integration hub for labs, pharmacies, hospitals, insurers. | nil | ₹1.25 Cr assigned value, defined as our cost to rebuild. Zero external customers. The Company Book itself lists billing, test coverage and DPDP controls as open debt. |
| Health recordsData | ~90,000 unique patients, 224,924 encounters, 34,224 patients with repeat encounters. | nil | ₹35 L one-time assigned value. Company-stated counts; consent basis and DPDP position not evidenced. |
Revenue ₹14.71 Cr FY26 to ₹9.24 Cr FY27E (−37%); strip out the cancelled contract and the rest grows. Gross margin ₹7.77 Cr to ₹4.34 Cr, holding at 47%. Burn ₹4.71 Cr to ₹1.58 Cr (−66%) on an operating cost base cut from ₹12.48 Cr to ₹5.92 Cr, with HQ salaries assumed to fall from ₹15 L to ₹8 L a month — a cut only four months in.
Their case: 2,815 non-member walk-ins a month × 1.28% walk-in-to-hospitalisation = 36 IPD a month, 432 a year, ₹64.8 L a year to Assured at ₹15,000 per IPD. Scales with walk-ins; our traffic reaches the hubs at zero acquisition cost.
Direction right, base overstated. The Company Book shows 2,331 non-member visits a month in Jan to Jul 2026, not 2,815, and the 1.28% ratio is drawn from insured members. I underwrite ₹40 to 45 L a year at today's volume; the upside is our traffic, not theirs.
Confidence: high near-term at 12 hubs · long-term rides on play 4
Doctor, patient and operations apps live across 12 hubs, standards-based records, integrations built. Valued at ₹1.25 Cr, our cost to rebuild. Their plan: sell it to clinics already on Practo, profit of ₹1 L a month rising ₹1 L each month.
Cost avoidance is real if we intend to build this anyway, and we do. Revenue is not: zero external customers, no pipeline behind the profit curve. Value it at build cost, never a revenue multiple, after a code audit.
Confidence: high on cost avoidance · low on the revenue line
10,000 lives at ₹5,000 revenue per life (₹4,000 IPD share plus ₹1,000 OPD add-on), five salespeople adding 20 lives a month each, claims suite from initiation to settlement. Their projection: ₹3.7 Cr Year 1 EBITDA at 74%.
The number I do not believe. The MIS shows insurance at 42% gross margin, shrinking 45%. The 74% case books ₹4,000 of an ₹8,000 premium to Clinikk; that needs checking against the insurer contract and IRDAI expense rules. Value the licence, claims capability and lives. Projection at zero.
Confidence: high on licence and claims value · low on projected EBITDA
FOCO revenue ₹0.23 to 0.67 Cr (+191%), EBITDA positive, franchisee carries capex and ramp losses, no fixed or marketing cost to Clinikk. Compact format: ground floor, GP plus care coordinator, ~100 pharmacy SKUs at 85% GM, Clinikk OS. COCO loses ₹1.5 Cr a year on ₹1.7 Cr revenue.
Where long-term value sits, and where the brand risk in section 04 becomes real. Near-term: stop COCO expansion, convert or close hubs that cannot reach unit breakeven, grow FOCO. The Month 6 COCO breakeven in the Acquisition Document has no support in three years of history; I do not plan on it.
Confidence: medium · format proven at small scale, not at 50 units
Burn is not the number that matters. ₹1.92 Cr of deferred expenses — future founder salaries — sit outside it, and ₹1.34 Cr of that lands in the eight months we would fund.
The MIS carries two separate measures and they diverge sharply in exactly the period Practo would carry. Burn is the cash operating loss: ₹1.58 Cr for FY27E, of which ₹0.87 Cr is already incurred and ₹0.71 Cr falls in Aug 2026 to Mar 2027. Final EBITDA adds deferred expenses and one-time items, giving ₹3.94 Cr — and for the Aug-to-Mar stretch it is ₹2.31 Cr against ₹0.71 Cr of burn, more than three times. The gap is the founders' deferred pay. Whether we inherit that obligation or it is settled at closing is a term-sheet question, not an accounting one, and it is worth more than the entire first-year cash burn.
| ₹ Cr | FY25 | FY26 | FY27E | Apr–Jul '26 incurred |
Aug '26–Mar '27 we would fund |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 14.43 | 14.71 | 9.24 | 3.07 | 6.17 |
| Gross margin | 7.52 | 7.77 | 4.34 | 1.47 | 2.88 |
| Total operating cost | 13.24 | 12.48 | 5.92 | 2.34 | 3.59 |
| of which HQ / G&A | 6.56 | 5.89 | 2.34 | 1.05 | 1.29 |
| Burn | (5.72) | (4.71) | (1.58) | (0.87) | (0.71) |
| Deferred — future founder salaries | — | 0.65 | 1.92 | 0.59 | 1.34 |
| One-time | — | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.17 | 0.27 |
| Final EBITDA | (5.72) | (5.62) | (3.94) | (1.63) | (2.31) |
The balance sheet is the other half of what transfers. Assets of ₹1.18 Cr against ₹3.31 Cr of payable liabilities — a net position of (₹2.13 Cr), which lands squarely in the ₹2 to 3 Cr of liability the Acquisition Document flagged without characterising. ₹57.00 L of employee obligations is confirmed as not payable and is excluded; ₹54.19 L of disputed amounts is excluded on instruction. Employee obligations are still the largest single line at 28% of the total.
| ₹ Lakh | Amount |
|---|---|
| Assets | |
| Tangible assets — depreciated | 59.94 |
| Rental deposits | 32.54 |
| Commission receivable | 8.18 |
| Inventory | 7.95 |
| Cash and equivalents | 6.35 |
| Receivables | 2.71 |
| Total assets | 117.67 |
| Liabilities, payable | |
| Employee obligations net of ₹57.00 L | 94.32 |
| Member and customer contingent | 72.66 |
| Borrowings, related-party | 55.24 |
| Trade payables and accruals | 39.05 |
| Franchise deposits | 21.47 |
| Insurance and claims | 20.60 |
| Property and lease | 15.33 |
| Statutory and tax dues | 12.38 |
| Total liabilities | 331.05 |
| Net position | (213.38) |
₹72.66 L of member and customer obligations is contingent, arising only on a one-go shutdown of the plan business with refunds to customers we can no longer serve. We are not shutting it down, so I underwrite the net position at (₹1.41 Cr) and treat the balance as a wind-down scenario, not a liability.
₹1.92 Cr of deferred founder pay is the live term. Either it is settled by the sellers at closing or it is priced into consideration. It should not arrive as a surprise post-close.
Four exposures sit at nil — contract termination, litigation and regulatory, wind-down and transition costs, future transition funding. Nil is a claim, not a finding; each needs confirming in diligence.
Against us: ₹0.71 Cr of burn we fund from August, ₹2.13 Cr of net liabilities assumed, and ₹1.34 Cr of deferred pay crystallising in the same window.
For us: ₹40 to 45 L of Assured downstream, ₹1.25 Cr of software build cost avoided (one-time), ₹35 L for the records (one-time), and ₹2.90 Cr of insurance gross margin on a base that shrank 45%.
Net: this does not pay for itself in Year 1. The case is strategic — the funnel, FOCO and the licence — and price and earn-out have to reflect that rather than the 74% insurance projection.
The moment a Practo-branded clinic appears in our search results, every hospital and GP that pays to be there has a reason to call us a competitor.
The marketplace works because we are neutral. Hospitals pay for placement and send us Assured cases on the understanding that we route demand on merit. An owned clinic network in the same catchments changes that in three ways. GPs on the marketplace in JP Nagar, HSR or Koramangala see us competing for their walk-ins. Hospitals on Assured see our own GPs deciding where 432 surgeries a year go. Insurers see us as both distributor and provider. The conflict is small at 12 hubs and large at 200 franchised ones, which is exactly the play carrying the most value. Amazon's private labels and Google Shopping (€2.4 Bn EU self-preferencing fine, 2017) are the cautionary cases; PharmEasy owning Thyrocare while listing rival labs is the closest Indian analogue.
No Practo badge on hubs. Listed as one provider among others, no ranking preference, written Assured referral rules that hospitals can read. Franchise under Clinikk.
Cost: some of the traffic-synergy upside. Gain: the marketplace stays credible while FOCO proves itself.
Maximum funnel, maximum conflict. This is Practo deciding to become a provider, which is a board question, not a corporate development one.
Revisit only once FOCO is at 25+ units with positive EBITDA and we have data on how listed GPs and hospitals actually respond.
Clinikk sits in its own entity, Practo supplies traffic and software under contract. Cleanest governance answer, weakest integration, and the founders' incentives drift.
Use if legal or the board wants a hard wall rather than a policy wall.
| Health hub | Rating | Google reviews |
|---|
Friendly doctor (69 mentions), polite staff (27), clear explanations (24). The praise is about the consultation itself, not the premises or the price. That is the asset: a GP experience patients rate 4.8 or better at every one of 12 locations, with no hub below the floor.
Clinical quality is the one thing here we cannot build by writing a cheque, and it is what makes the Assured funnel and the FOCO play work: a referral from a 4.9 GP carries weight, a franchise carrying a 4.9 average is sellable. Every franchised hub is held to a 4.8 Google floor, measured on public listings rather than internal NPS, and a hub below it for two quarters is a convert-or-close candidate. That is also my answer to the Practo-brand question: we do not need our badge on the door for the quality to travel.
The Company Book quotes ≈23,290 reviews at 4.78; that count is not reproducible from the listings, so I use the direct read. Bannerghatta Road currently shows a temporarily-closed status. Deck adds Play Store 4.7 and an NPS of 91, both company-stated.
Value retail, FOCO, the software at build cost and the licence with its 10,000 lives. Insurance EBITDA projection at zero. Software revenue at zero.
₹1.92 Cr of deferred pay settled by sellers or priced in. Net liabilities underwritten at (₹1.41 Cr), with the four nil exposures confirmed.
Near-term high: Assured funnel at 12 hubs, software cost avoidance. Long-term medium: FOCO at scale. Long-term low: insurance economics as projected.